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Three and Out: The NFL's Concussion
Liability and How Players Can Tackle
the Problem
ABSTRACT

In 1952, the New England Journal of Medicine published a

study stating that a player should not continue playing professional
football after suffering three concussions. As players continue to get
bigger, faster, and stronger, the number of concussions has increased.
In response to this problem, the National Football League (NFL)
commissioned a study run by scientists and NFL team doctors to
determine the long-term effects of concussions. That committee
determined that no long-term repercussions exist after experiencing a
concussion while playing NFL football. Despite the scientific
community's critiques of the study, the NFL used the committee's
findings to create the league's return-to-play guidelines, as well as
other player safety rules. Further cementing skepticism of the
committee's findings, in 2005, Neurosurgery published an article
linking concussions suffered during an NFL player's career to cognitive
deteriorationbased on autopsy results of a former player.
The NFL vigorously denied the Neurosurgery article's
conclusions and attempted to discredit the writers. The NFL continued
to use its flawed committee studies to craft league rules, despite the
growing chorus in the medical community citing its flaws. Because the
NFL used these findings to craft its safety rules, it exposed the players
to unnecessary risk. This Note will show that the NFL acted both
negligently and fraudulently towards its players, and the players
should file a lawsuit in order to recover compensation for the harm
that the league caused them. The players should file this suit in the
district of Minnesota in order to capitalize on the district's previous
favorable rulings for the players in the 2011 lockout dispute with the
league's owners. This Note concludes that the players should succeed
and win damages first for their pain and suffering, and second, to
punish the NFL for its wrongful behavior.
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Week six of the 2010 National Football League (NFL) season
played host to several highly anticipated matchups. 1 One of the
marquee games that week matched the 4-1 Atlanta Falcons and the
3-2 Philadelphia Eagles. 2 While only the most diehard Eagles and
Falcons fans can remember the final score, no one around the league
has forgotten the devastating collision between Eagles receiver
DeSean Jackson and Falcons cornerback Dunta Robinson. 3 In the
second quarter, Jackson ran a short crossing pattern and attempted to
catch a pass; 4 Robinson stopped Jackson's attempt through a violent
collision where Robinson led with his shoulder and hit the defenseless
Jackson in both the shoulder and the helmet.6 After the hit, both
players remained down on the field for several minutes while team
medical personnel tended to them. 6 Training staff had to help them
off the field; neither player returned to the game. 7 Later, doctors
diagnosed both players with concussions, 8 which are dangerous
injuries partially because they can lead to cognitive impairment over
time. 9

2010 NFL Power Rankings: Week 6, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nfl/powerrankings/_
1.
year/2010/week/6 (last updated Oct. 12, 2010) (providing weekly rankings of all thirty-two NFL
teams from ESPN's NFL reporters and noting several games during week six between highly
ranked teams).
2.
Ryan Frye, NFL Week 6: Atlanta Falcons at Philadelphia Eagles Breakdown,
BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 14, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/491643-nfl-week-6-atlantafalcons-at-philadelphia-eagles-breakdown (detailing quarterback Michael Vick's game against
his old team and outlining the keys to victory for each side). The story also noted how DeSean
Jackson would have a big impact on the game. Id.
3.
Matt Ryan's Career-high 4 TDs Rally Falcons Over Hurt Michael Vick, Eagles,
ESPN (Sept. 18, 2011, 8:20 PM), http://scores.espn.go.comlnfllrecap?gameld=310918001
(recapping the 2011 Eagles-Falcons game that involved another devastating hit from Atlanta's
Dunta Robinson). The hit's similarity to the one that Robinson made on DeSean Jackson in last
year's game is the only mention of the teams' most recent previous matchup. Id.
DeSean Jackson, Dunta Robinson Injured (NFL Video Oct. 17, 2010), available at
4.
http://www.nfl.com/videos/nfl-game-highlights/09000d5d81b62126/DeSean-Jackson-Dunta-Robi
nson-injured.
Id.; DeSean Jackson Exits After Hard Hit, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
5.
story?id=5696367 (last updated Oct. 18, 2010).
DeSean Jackson, Dunta Robinson Injured, supra note 4; DeSean Jackson Exits After
6.
Hard Hit, supra note 5.
Adam Caplan, NFL Levies Huge Fines for Hits to Head, FoxSPORTS, http://msn.
7.
foxsports.com/nfl/story/helmet-fines-James-Harrison-Dunta-Robinson-Brandon-Meriweather101910 (last updated Oct. 20, 2010).
Dunta Robinson has Concussion, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
8.
story?id=5700217 (last updated Oct. 19, 2010); Gregg Rosenthal, DeSean Jackson Suffers Second
Concussion in Less Than a Year, PROFOOTBALLTALK (Oct. 17, 2010, 4:41 PM), http://
profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/10/17/desean-jackson-suffers-second-concussion-in-less-thana-year.
See infra Part I.C.2.
9.
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This was Jackson's second concussion in a year.10 After his
first concussion, Jackson's coach hassled him about not coming back to
play the following week.' Robinson, meanwhile, suffered blame for a
fifteen-yard penaltyl 2 and a $50,000 fine from the NFL, 13 but received
his head coach's support.14
This severe collision was only one of three illegal hits that week
resulting in a substantial fine from the NFL.15 Those hits by
Robinson, James Harrison, and Brandon Meriweather received much
media attention,16 prompting the NFL to release a new video to
players and teams on illegal hits and player safety.' 7 These hits
quickly became symbols of the need for increased attention to player
safety, both within the league itself and in the popular media.' 8
10.
Rosenthal, supra note 8. Jackson suffered a concussion during the 2009 season and
the injury forced him to miss playing time. Id.
11.
Id. "In the offseason, Jackson said that offensive coordinator Marty Mornhinweg
gave the wideout a hard time for missing the game. 'Our offensive coordinator, Marty
Mornhinweg, said some things, trying to question my toughness,' Jackson told Sporting News. 'I
was like "Coach, I just got a concussion. This [is] my brain. If it's anything else, my shoulder,
whatever, I'm going to play."' Id. (alternation in original).
12.
Dunta Robinson has Concussion, supra note 8.
13.
Caplan, supra note 7; Mike Florio, NFL Fines James Harrison $75,000; Dunta
Robinson $50,000, PROFOOTBALLTALK (Oct. 19, 2010, 4:29 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.
com/2010/10/19/nfl-fines-james-harrison-75000-dunta-robinson-50000.
14.
Caplan, supra note 7 (claiming that it did not look to Coach Smith as if there had
been any "helmet to helmet" contact).
15.
Id.; Florio, supra note 13. In a game between the New England Patriots and the
Baltimore Ravens, New England safety Brandon Meriweather was fined $50,000 for an illegal
hit on Ravens tight end Todd Heap. Meriweather Flagged for Hit on Heap (NFL Video May 9,
2011), available at http://www.nfl.com/videos/new-england-patriots/O9000d5d8lfcOc5flMeriwe
ather-flagged-for-hit-on-Heap. Pittsburgh Steelers linebacker James Harrison was fined $75,000
for his illegal hit on Cleveland Browns receiver Mohamed Massaquoi the same day. Massaquoi
Injury (NFL Video Oct. 17, 2010), available at http://www.nfl.com/videos/nfl-game-highhghts/
09000d5d8lb62fdd/Massaquoi-injury. Harrison reportedly received a larger fine from the league
because he was a repeat offender. Id.
16.
Gregg Rosenthal, Setting Mark Schlereth Straight on a Few Points Regarding "Big
Hits", PROFOOTBALLTALK (Oct. 20, 2010, 7:21 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbesports.com/2010/10/
20/setting-mark-schlereth-straight-on-a-few-points-regarding-big-hits (citing ESPN's coverage
from Monday night until Tuesday morning on NFL Live and SportsCenter about "big hits" in the
NFL).
17.
NBC Sports, NFL Releases Video on Player Safety, PROFOOTBALLTALK (Oct. 21,
2010, 6:58 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/10/2 1/nfl-releases-video-on-playersafety; Player Safety (NFL Video Oct. 21, 2010), available at http://www.nfl.com/videos/nflvideos/09000d5d81b80962/Player-safety. Dunta Robinson's hit on DeSean Jackson is featured
prominently by Ray Anderson, the NFL's Executive Vice President of Football Operations, in the
player safety video. Player Safety, supra.
18.
See, e.g., James Harrison, SI VAULT, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/cover/
featured/I1474/index.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2012) (showing a Sports Illustratedcover picturing
James Harrison's hit on Mohamed Massaquoi); NFL Regrets Photo 'Mistake, ESPN,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5706132 (last updated Oct. 25, 2010) (explaining the
NFL made a mistake by selling photos of James Harrison's illegal hit on Mohamed Massaquoi on
its website); Gregg Rosenthal, League is Selling Photo of James Harrison's Illegal Hit,
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Despite the wide attention they garnered, 19 illegal hits continue
throughout the league. 20 The hits by Robinson, Meriweather, and
Harrison caused incalculable neurological damage to themselves and,
more importantly, to their victims.
This Note analyzes different aspects of the NFL's problem with
cognitive deterioration in former players, and what the league should
do to remedy the situation. Part I provides an overview of brain
health and concussions. It also addresses the NFL's history as a
business and as an athletic organization, considering what the league
has done to cause brain injuries in its players and its insufficient
previous attempts to address those problems. Part II explores the
hurdles that players face in bringing a brain-health suit against the
NFL and on behalf of former and current players who may suffer from
cognitive degeneration because of concussions. Finally, Part III
provides a solution: a litigation strategy for players to pursue claims
against the NFL for its inadequate and ineffectual handling of player
brain health issues. This strategy involves different causes of action
and a recommendation to file a suit in the district of Minnesota,
because of the players' successful litigation history in the 2011 lockout
dispute with the league's owners.
I. SCOUTING THE OPPONENT:
THE HISTORY OF CONCUSSIONS AND THE NFL

It is important to analyze the NFL and concussions among its
players as interrelated issues rather than looking at individual
aspects in a vacuum. After exploring the physical repercussions of
traumatic brain injuries and the history of concussions in football, this
Part will look at the NFL and how the organization has attempted to
PROFOOTBALLTALK (Oct. 19, 2010, 11:12 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2010/10/19/
league-is-selling-photo-of-james-harrisons-illegal-hit (noting that despite fining Pittsburgh's
James Harrison $75,000 for his hit on Cleveland receiver Mohamaed Massaquoi, the NFL was
selling photos of the hit on its website for prices varying between $15.95 to $249.95); see also
Player Safety, supra note 17. After the NFL's "mistake," the league also noted, "[it] will ensure
that no photos of illegal plays will be available again. An outside vendor uses an automated
process to post photos for sale to fans. [It] will fix the process immediately." NFL Regrets Photo
'Mistake',supra (internal quotation marks omitted). All three of the hits by Robinson, Harrison,
and Meriweather were featured in the player safety video shown around the league following
week six of the 2010 NFL season. Player Safety, supra note 17. The hits were used as specific
examples of illegal hits that the league will punish through either fines or suspensions. Id.
19.
See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
20.
See, e.g., Bill Williamson, Richard Seymour Fined for Schaub Hit, ESPN,
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/lid/7102400/oakland-raiders-richard-seymour-fined-15k-againillegal-hit (last updated Oct. 14, 2011) (citing Oakland Raiders defensive tackle Richard
Seymour's $15,000 fine for an illegal hit, his second in two weeks, and Baltimore Ravens running
back Ray Rice's $7,500 fine for grabbing the facemask of Bradley Fletcher of the St. Louis Rams).
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address concussions over time. The 2002 death of Hall of Fame
Center Mike Webster was particularly noteworthy in this regard, as it
spurred debate on the issue that continues today. Meanwhile, the
NFL's role as a business organization has also played a significant role
in limiting its ability to address the concussion problem and other
brain injuries that result from playing professional football.
A. The Medical History of Concussions
In November 2001, the inaugural International Conference on
Concussion in Sport defined a concussion as a "complex
pathophysiological process affecting the brain, induced by traumatic
biomechanical forces." 21 Doctors and medical staff diagnose a brain
injury based on whether the victim loses consciousness, though loss of
consciousness is not necessarily indicative of the severity of the
injury. 22 While medical professionals are still struggling to fully
understand concussions and brain injuries in order to improve athlete
safety, 2 3 it is clear that physical contact in sports can result in such
injuries. 24 In fact, a study first reported brain changes in professional
Mark Aubry et al., Summary and Agreement Statement of the First International
21.
Conference on Concussion in Sport, Vienna 2001, 36 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 6, 6 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted), available at http://bjsm.bmj.com/content/36/1/6.full. The summary
determined:
[A c]oncussion is defined as a complex pathophysiological process affecting the brain,
induced by traumatic biomechanical forces. Several common features that incorporate
clinical, pathological, and biomechanical injury constructs that may be used in
defining the nature of a concussive head injury include:
[1] Concussion may be caused by a direct blow to the head, face, neck, or
elsewhere on the body with an "impulsive" force transmitted to the head.
[2] Concussion typically results in the rapid onset of short lived impairment of
neurological function that resolves spontaneously.
[3] Concussion may result in neuropathological changes but the acute clinical
symptoms largely reflect a functional disturbance rather than structural injury.
[4] Concussion results in a graded set of clinical syndromes that may or may not
involve loss of consciousness. Resolution of the clinical and cognitive symptoms
typically follows a sequential course.
[5] Concussion is typically associated with grossly normal structural
neuroimaging studies.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 7. "The traditional approach to severe traumatic brain injury using loss of
22.
consciousness as the primary measure of injury severity has acknowledged limitations in
assessing the severity of concussive injury. Findings in this field describe association of loss of
consciousness with specific early deficits but does not necessarily imply severity." Id.
Id. at 6. "The aim of the symposium [in 2001] was to provide recommendations for
23.
the improvement of safety and health of athletes who suffer concussive injuries . . . ." Id.
Harrison S. Martland, Punch Drunk, 91 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 1103, 1103 (1928). The
24.
article reported:
For some time fight fans and promoters have recognized a peculiar condition
occurring among prize fighters which, in ring parlance, they speak of as 'punch
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boxers in 1952.25 Even that study, conducted more than a half century
ago, noted that injuries less severe than concussions (which medical
professionals call "sub-concussions") had the potential to lead to brain
damage. 26 In 1952, the New England Journal of Medicine published
another medical study addressing injuries in football and other
sports. 27 This study noted that football players should no longer play
after suffering more than three concussions. 28
"Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy," a 2005 medical study
that would bring about much debate on the issue of football player
brain health was published in Neurosurgery, and it stated that
concussions professional football players suffer are "related to
translational acceleration-deceleration, with considerable head impact
velocity and velocity changes."29 In other words, concussions occur
when there is a transfer of kinetic force that causes increased strain in
brain tissue and pressure waves within the skull.30 Unfortunately,
helmets do not solve that problem, because they do a much better job
of protecting players' skulls, rather than their brains. 31 Nationally
recognized neurosurgeon Dr. Julian Bailes explains how helmet
technology has continued to improve:
drunk.' Fighters in whom the early symptoms are well recognized are said by the fans
to be 'cuckoo,' 'goofy,' 'cutting paper dolls,' or 'slug nutty.'
Punch drunk most often affects fighters of the slugging type, who are usually poor
boxers and who take considerable head punishment, seeking only to land a knockout
blow. It is also common in second rate fighters used for training purposes, who may be
knocked down several times a day.
Id. These same symptoms could also be ascribed to many NFL players after being the victim of
both legal and illegal hits that occur each Sunday. See McCoy Takes Helmet-to-Helmet Hit (NFL
Video Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://www.nfl.com/videos/cleveland-browns/09000d5d824dfffl/
McCoy-takes-helmet-to-helmet-hit.
25.
Ewald W. Busse & Albert J. Silverman, Electroencephalographic Changes in
Professional Boxers, 149 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1522, 1522 (1952). "[T]he mild psychic changes
observed in a high percentage of boxers ... are due to brain damage, which is also responsible for
the less frequently seen, so-called 'punch-drunk' person, who is in fact in a state of traumatic
dementia and reveals severe psychic and neurological abnormalities." Id.
26.
Id. "If the trauma is severe or is mild but repeated at intervals that do not permit
the brain to return to normal functioning, permanent damage may result." Id.
27.
Augustus Thorndike, Serious Recurrent Injuries of Athletes-Contraindications to
Further Competitive Participation,247 NEw ENG. J. MED. 554, 555 (1952).
Id. at 555-56. "Patients with cerebral concussion that has recurred more than three
28.
times or with more than momentary loss of consciousness at any one time should not be exposed
to further body-contact trauma." Id.
Bennet I. Omalu et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football
29.
League Player, 57 NEUROSURGERY 128, 131 (2005).
Richard M. Greenwald et al., Head Impact Severity Measures for Evaluating Mild
30.
TraumaticBrain Injury Risk Exposure, 62 NEUROSURGERY 789, 789-90 (2008).
Jeanne Marie Laskas, Game Brain, GQ, Oct. 2009, http://www.gq.com/sports/
31.
profiles/200909/nfl-players-brain-dementia-study-memory-concussions. Forensic pathologist Dr.
Bennet Omalu noted that he had done many autopsies of people in motorcycle accidents where
the helmet protected the skull and it was not damaged, but the brain was "mush." Id.
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In the old days of football, you had this leather cap to protect your ears. That was it.
You'd never put your head in the game. You'd be knocked out after the first play! Even
32
in the '60s, the helmet was a light shell. The modern helmet is like a weapon.

But these technological advancements have improved only skull
protection, not protection of the brain underneath. 33 Today, helmets
have become more of a sword than a shield because they provide more
protection, and the players wearing helmets feel invincible. 34
B. The NFL's Many Rule Changes Shows the League's Flaws
The NFL has slowly enacted some moderate rule changes to
make professional football somewhat safer; together these rule
changes represent a tacit admission that the league has not taken
head injuries seriously enough.35 One of the first rules passed
addressing head safety, enacted in 1962, included a prohibition
against grabbing another player's facemask. 36 But a rule change will
not affect the game unless in-game sanctions are attached to it;31 and
until 1976, the NFL did not include an in-game penalty for violating
the rule. 38 The penalty for incidentally touching an opponent's
facemask was five yards, while the penalty for pulling or twisting the
facemask was fifteen yards. 39 If a referee judged the foul to be vicious
or flagrant, then the player could be ejected. 40 In 1977, the NFL
outlawed the head slap by passing the "Deacon Jones Rule." 41 The
rule is named after Hall of Fame defensive lineman Deacon Jones who
frequently slapped the offensive lineman's head to get around him
during a play. 42
32.
Id.
33.
But see Omalu, supra note 29. "The injury potential of these transferring inertial
forces is ameliorated by the use of protective helmets." Id.
34.
Complaint
7, Easterling v. NFL, 2011 WL 3627055 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (No.
11CV05209) [hereinafter EasterlingComplaint].
35.
See Complaint 118, Maxwell v. NFL, No. BC465842 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 19, 2011)
[hereinafter Maxwell Complaint].
Id. 118(b).
36.
37.
See generally id. 118 (providing a non-exhaustive list of both in-game and out-ofgame sanctions imposed by the NFL); supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
See Maxwell Complaint, supra note 35, T 118(c) (describing the NFL's enactment a
38.
rule in 1976 that imposed an in-game penalty for grabbing another player's facemask).
39.

Id.

40.
Id.
41.
Complaint 61(d), Barnes v. NFL, 2011 WL 3791910 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2011)
(No. BC468483) [hereinafter Barnes Complaint] (naming the rule after defensive end Deacon
Jones who used the technique, which "prohibited players from slapping the head of another . ..
during the play").
42.
Id. Deacon Jones is a Hall of Fame defensive end who played for the Los Angeles
Rams, San Diego Chargers, and Washington Redskins. Deacon of Defense, PRO FOOTBALL HALL
OF FAME, http://www.profootballhof.com/hof/release.aspx?RELEASE_ID=774 (last visited Mar. 3,
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Before the 1979 season, the NFL finally passed a rule
prohibiting players from using their helmets to "butt, spear or ram an
opponent with the crown or top of the helmet." 4 3 Despite the rule
change, "[d]uring the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, players in the NFL
were being coached, trained and motivated to use all portions of their
helmets to block, tackle, butt, spear, ram and/or injure opposing
players" by striking the opposing players with their helmeted heads. 44
Finally, in 1996, referees began calling in-game personal fouls for
helmet-to-helmet hits. 45 Prior to this rule change, the NFL turned a
blind eye to the fact that players were using their helmets to bring
down their opponents, and their coaches were encouraging such
activity. 46
The delay in rule change is unfortunate, because eliminating
the head as a tool in tackling and blocking is necessary to reduce the
cognitive decline in NFL players. 47 Prior to the 2011 season, the NFL
changed the rules for kickoffs, moving the ball from the thirty-yard
line to the thirty-five-yard line in order to increase the number of
touchbacks and the safety of the returners. 48 This rule change came
even though the NFL's own research committee classified kickoff
2012). He was known for slapping the head of an opposing offensive lineman in order to get
around that lineman and to the quarterback. Id. He once said he used the head slap in order "[t]o
give [him] an initial headstart on the pass rush, in other words an extra step. Because anytime
you go upside a man's head, or woman, they may have tendency to blink they eyes or close they
eyes. And that's all I needed." Deacon Jones, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deacon_
Jones (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43.
EasterlingComplaint, supra note 34, 5.
44.
Id. 6.
45.
Id. 7.
46.
Id. The fact that it took seventeen seasons for "spearing" to become a personal foul
shows the lack of seriousness with which the NFL viewed the problem. See id. If the NFL had
thought it an issue of greater importance, a game penalty would have accompanied a rule change
much sooner. See id.
47.
Robert C. Cantu & Frederick 0. Mueller, CatastrophicFootball Injuries: 1977-1998,
47 NEUROSURGERY 673, 674 (2000). The article reported:
[E]liminat[ing] the head as a primary and initial contact area for blocking and
tackling, [is] of utmost importance. Coaches should drill the players in proper
execution of football fundamentals, particularly blocking and tackling: shoulder block
and tackle with the head up-keep the head out of football. ...
Coaches and officials should discourage the players from using their heads as
battering rams when blocking, tackling, and ball carrying. The rules prohibiting
spearing should be enforced in practice and in games. Players should be taught to
respect the helmet as a protective device and that the helmet should not be used as a
weapon.
Id. The NFL failed to properly police the use of the helmet for seventeen seasons after initially
promulgating the rule. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
48.
Jarrett Bell, New NFL Kickoff Rule Could be Game-Changer,USA TODAY, Sept. 11,
2011, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2011-09-08-new-nfl-rule-could-change-kickoffreturn-strategy-n.htm.
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returners and return units as "low risk" for brain injury. 49 If the
committee's findings are correct, it leads one to question why the NFL
would alter the rule in a way that many coaches, players, and former
players dislike.50 These rule changes represent an implied admission
by the NFL that injuries occur as a direct result of impact to the head,
and the NFL's reluctance to institute penalties during the game
reflects that it did not take these injuries seriously for many years,
and still fails to do so.
C. The NFL Attempts to Tackle the Concussion Problem by Committee
In 1994, then-NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue concluded
there were unanswered questions about concussions in football and
convened a commission on mild traumatic brain injury to address
those questions. 5 1 The panel consisted of NFL team medical personnel
as well as outside professionals including a biomedical engineer, and
doctors with specialties in neurology, neurosurgery, neuropsychology,
The committee recommended independent
and epidemiology. 52
scientific research rather than having NFL team medical practitioners
involved, "to foster better understanding of the causes, diagnosis,
treatment and prevention of concussions." 53 The NFL ignored the
recommendation for independent research and instead used the
existing commission as the starting point of its committee dedicated to
studying concussions. 54

49.
Elliot J. Pellman et al., Concussion in Professional Football: Epidemiological
Features of Game Injuries and Review of Literature-Part3, 54 NEUROSURGERY 81, 85 (2004).
"The positions at low risk [for concussions] were punter, return unit, kicker, and holder." Id.
50.
Bell, supra note 48 (featuring several quotes from coaches, players, and former
players expressing displeasure with the rule change).
51.
Paul Tagliabue, Editorial, Tackling Concussions in Sports, 53 NEUROSURGERY 796,
796 (2003) ("[Als [the NFL] looked more deeply into the specific area of concussions, [the NFL]
realized that there were many more questions than answers.").
52.
Id.
Id. Supporting independent research warrants asking how independent the
53.
research can be if the doctors and scientists conducting the research are directly funded by the
group that has a large stake in the findings of the research coming out a certain way.
54.
Id. In 1994, the Commissioner appointed, "an NFL committee on mild traumatic
brain injury with experts from inside and outside [the NFL]," which recommended independent
research. Id. Commissioner Tagliabue wrote the letter in Neurosurgery as an introduction to the
first installment of the NFL's Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee findings. See id. That
same committee that recommended independent research became the committee that published
the research, and was saluted by Commissioner Tagliabue as "our Mild Traumatic Brain Injury
Committee." Id.; see also Elliot J. Pellman, Editorial, Background on the National Football

League's Research on Concussion in ProfessionalFootball, 53 NEUROSURGERY 797, 797 (2003).
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The NFL invited rheumatologist Dr. Elliot Pellman to chair the
new Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI) Committee55 because of his
position as the New York Jets' associate team physician.56 Dr.
Pellman served as the committee's spokesperson 7 and lead author of
nine of the committee's thirteen reports published in the medical
journal Neurosurgery.58 However, as a rheumatologist, concussions
and cognitive injuries are not Dr. Pellman's medical specialty. 59 Dr.
Pellman's experience in the NFL may have been useful to the
committee, but his lack of expertise in brain injuries made him a
questionable choice to head the committee.60 Dr. Pellman was still
serving on the Jets' medical staff while publishing the MTBI
Committee's findings in 2003.61 During that season, Dr. Pellman
treated Jets receiver Wayne Chrebet, who suffered a concussion

55.
Maxwell Complaint, supra note 35, 120. A rheumatologist is, "[a] specialist in the
non-surgical treatment of rheumatic illnesses, especially arthritis. Rheumatologists have special
interests in unexplained rash, fever, arthritis, anemia, weakness, weight loss, fatigue, joint or
pain, autoimmune disease, and anorexia." Definition of Rheumatologist,
muscle
MEDICINENET.COM (Apr. 27, 2011, 5:27 PM), http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?
articlekey=11968.
56.
Pellman, supra note 54. Dr. Pellman's work with the Jets was of interest because
Jets receiver Al Toon suffered from what later would be known as post-concussion syndrome and
was "the first documented NFL player that [Dr. Pellman knew] of to retire as a result of this
problem." Id.
Id.
57.
See generally Pellman et al., supra note 49; Elliot J. Pellman et al., Concussion in
58.
ProfessionalFootball:Helmet Testing to Assess Impact Performance-Part11, 58 NEUROSURGERY
78 (2006); Elliot J. Pellman et al., Concussion in Professional Football: Injuries Involving 7 or
More Days Out-Part 5, 55 NEUROSURGERY 1110 (2004) [hereinafter Pellman et al., Part 5];
Elliot J. Pellman et al., Concussion in Professional Football: Location and Direction of Helmet
Impact-Part 2, 53 NEUROSURGERY 1328 (2003) [hereinafter Pellman et al., Part 2]; Elliot J.
Pellman et al., Concussion in Professional Football: Neuropsychological Testing-Part 6, 55
NEUROSURGERY 1290 (2004); Elliot J. Pellman et al., Concussion in Professional Football:Players
Returning to the Same Game-Part 7, 56 NEUROSURGERY 79 (2005) [hereinafter Pellman et al.,
Part 7]; Elliot J. Pellman et al., Concussion in Professional Football: Reconstruction of Game
Impacts and Injuries, 53 NEUROSURGERY 799 (2003) [hereinafter Pellman et al., Part 1]; Elliot J.
Pellman et al., Concussion in Professional Football:Recovery of NFL and High School Athletes
Assessed by Computerized Neuropsychological Testing-Part 12, 58 NEUROSURGERY 263 (2006);
Elliot J. Pellman et al., Concussion in Professional Football: Repeat Injuries-Part 4, 55
NEUROSURGERY 860 (2004) [hereinafter Pellman et al., Part 4].
59.
Maxwell Complaint, supra note 35,
120.
60.
Laskas, supra note 31. The article recounted:
[Dr. Bennet] Omalu began to question the integrity of the [NFL's Mild Traumatic
Brain Injury] committee. It was one thing to not even put a neuropathologist on the
committee, quite another to have the committee headed by. . . a rheumatologist, as
was the case with Pellman. A rheumatologist? You picked a joint guy to lead your
brain study?
Id.
61.

See supranote 58.
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during a November game.62 Even though Chrebet lost consciousness
from the hit, Pellman cleared Chrebet to re-enter the game. 63 Placing
Chrebet back in the game shows that Dr. Pellman did not understand
the severity of concussions and their effects. Despite this, Pellman
was appointed to chair the MTBI Committee, which ultimately found
such a practice proper and within appropriate medical standards.
Under Dr. Pellman's leadership, the MTBI Committee
published a thirteen-part study over the course of three years. 64 The
committee dedicated its first several meetings to crafting a proper
definition for concussion.65 That process led to the rebranding of
concussion to "the more academically appropriate term, mild
traumatic brain injury," commonly abbreviated as MTBI. 6 6
1. The MTBI Committee Publishes its Findings
The MTBI Committee wrote about a variety of scientific claims
associated with different aspects of the NFL and its intersection with
concussions and concussion science.67 Its first two published studies
used game film to reconstruct in-game hitS6 8 and concluded that

62.

Jennifer Ann Heiner, Comment, Concussions in the National Football League: Jani

v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan and a Legal Analysis of the NFL's 2007
ConcussionManagement Guidelines, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 255, 287 (2008).
Id.
63.

64.

See generally David C. Viano et al., Concussion in Professional Football: Brain

Responses by Finite Element Analysis: Part 9, 57 NEUROSURGERY 891 (2005); David C. Viano et

al., Concussion in Professional Football: Comparison with Boxing Head Impacts-Part 10, 57
NEUROSURGERY 1154 (2005) [hereinafter Viano et al., Part 10]; David C. Viano & Elliot J.

Pellman, Concussion in Professional Football: Biomechanics of the Striking Player-Part8, 56
NEUROSURGERY 266 (2005); David C. Viano et al., Concussion in Professional Football:
Performanceof Newer Helmets in Reconstructed Game Impacts-Part 13, 59 NEUROSURGERY 591
(2006); supra text accompanying note 55-58.
65.
See Pellman, supra note 54.
Id. The report stated:
66.
A reportable MTBI was defined as a traumatically induced alteration in brain
function that is manifested by 1) alteration of awareness or consciousness, including
but not limited to loss of consciousness, "ding," sensation of being dazed or stunned,
sensation of "wooziness" or "fogginess," seizure, or amnesic period; and 2) signs and
symptoms commonly associated with postconcussion syndrome, including persistent
headaches, vertigo, light-headedness, loss of balance, unsteadiness, syncope,
near-syncope, cognitive dysfunction, memory disturbance, hearing loss, tinnitus,
blurred vision, diplopia, visual loss, personality change, drowsiness, lethargy, fatigue,
and inability to perform usual daily activities.
Id. at 797-98. Wayne Chrebet suffered from many of these symptoms when Dr. Pellman cleared
him to reenter the game in November 2003. Peter Keating, Doctor Yes, ESPN MAG. (Nov. 6,
2006), http://sports.espn.go.comlespnmag/story?id=3644940.
67.
See infra notes 68-100 and accompanying text.
68.
Pellman et al., Part 1, supra note 58, at 800; Pellman et al., Part 2, supra note 58.
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facemask attacks increased the head's lateral acceleration. 69 The
second study questioned whether correct tackling techniques, rather
than spearing (using the crown of the helmet), might lower the
number of MTBIs. 70 Though the NFL banned spearing in 197971 and
made it a personal foul penalty in 1996,72 spearing-or something
close to it-made up 94 out of 107 helmet impacts in one portion of the
study.73
The MTBI Committee found that reported concussions occurred
at a rate of 0.41 concussions per game between the 1996 and 2001
seasons.74 Over 51 percent of the players who suffered a reported
concussion either continued playing after little to no rest or returned
to play in the same game after briefly resting on the bench.75 Team
medical staff generally examined players after a hit and allowed those
whose symptoms had apparently resolved to return to the game
immediately.76 This puts players at serious risk of suffering second
impact syndrome (SIS)77 along with the possibility of receiving chronic

Pellman et al., Part 2, supra note 58, at 1335 ("Impacts to the facemask generally
69.
twist the head while accelerating it. This increases the lateral component of acceleration. The
combination of kinematics and shifting vector of acceleration may be a factor influencing
concussion tolerance."). Any increase in acceleration will lead to the brain hitting the skull
harder once the player's head is no longer accelerating, because the brain is sitting in spinal fluid
in the skull. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
70.
Pellman et al., Part 2, supra note 58, at 1336-37.
71.
EasterlingComplaint, supra note 34.
72.
Id.
73.
Pellman et al., Part 2, supra note 58, at 1331 (analyzing numbers displayed in Table
3). Those numbers came from video of NFL games that took place between 1996 and 2001. Id. at
1329. Spearing was a personal foul penalty during all of the games that the MTBI committee
used in the study. See EasterlingComplaint, supra note 34.
74.
Pellman et al., supra note 49, at 84 ("During the 1996 to 2001 NFL seasons, there
were 787 reported cases of MTBI in 3826 team-games (1913 games). This total included all
preseason, regular-season, and playoff game-related concussions. Concussions occurred with an
average incidence of 131.2 ± 26.8 concussions/yr and a rate of 0.41 concussion/game.").
75.
See id. at 86. The study reported:
16.1% of the players returned immediately to the game, including players who were
evaluated on the field and returned to play and players who withdrew from the game
for a few plays and then returned to play. The rest of the players rested for an
extended period of time and returned in the same game (35.6%) or were removed from
play and did not return to the game ....

Id.
76.
Pellman et al., Part 7, supra note 58, at 86 (stating that generally after the collision,
team medical personnel examined the player and he exhibited no outward concussion symptoms,
resulting in the player being able to return the next time he was supposed to go back into the
game).
77.
See Robert C. Cantu, Second Impact Syndrome, 17 CLINICS SPORTS MED. 37, 38
(1998) ("The syndrome occurs when an athlete who sustains a head injury-often a concussion or
worse injury, such as a cerebral contusion-sustains a second head injury before symptoms
associated with the first have cleared.").
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brain damage. 8 The committee also criticized "currently promulgated
guidelines for the management of sports-related concussion[s]" that
protect against injuries such as SIS and post-concussion syndrome as
"too conservative for professional football." 79
Post-concussion syndrome is the group of symptoms that follow
a MTBI, which includes frequent headaches, light-headedness,
memory problems, and vertigo.80 The MTBI Committee found that a
large percentage of NFL players allegedly recover fully from
concussions within one hour, while post-concussion signs and
symptoms resolve more quickly in NFL players than they do in nonathletes.81 Many of these symptoms are subjective because tests rely
on players reporting how they feel; 82 and because NFL player
contracts are not guaranteed beyond the current season, players have
an incentive to report full recovery immediately to get back on the
field and keep their jobs.83
The committee assumed that the injuries players did not report
were mild and associated with fast recovery. 84 According to the
committee, "NFL players are a highly conditioned, physically fit
population accustomed to playing with pain and highly motivated to
return to play as soon as possible."85 The committee noted that these
characteristics of NFL players might make them "less susceptible to
MTBI and prolonged post-concussion syndrome than the general
population,"86 but the committee did not mention that a player's brain
is put at greater risk of permanent damage if a concussed player
returns to the game prior to full recovery.87
Despite the MTBI Committee using what it curiously defined
as a "very broad and inclusive definition of MTBI to capture as many
cases as possible," the committee still deemed players safe to return to

78.
See Daniel J. Kain, Note, "It'sJust a Concussion:" The National Football League's
Denial of a Causal Link Between Multiple Concussions and Later-Life Cognitive Decline, 40
RUTGERS L.J. 697, 704 (2009) (stating athletes not recovered from a previous concussion are
susceptible to serious consequences upon a second concussive incident).
79.
Pellman et al., Part 4, supra note 58, at 870 (criticizing the exclusion periods that
prevent second impact syndrome).
Pellman, supranote 54, at 797-98.
80.
81.
Pellman et al., Part 5, supra note 58, at 1119.
82.
See Kain, supra note 78, at 705 ("[T]reatment of concussions are almost entirely
based on the nature of the incident and the player's communication of his symptoms to a treating
clinician.").
See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
83.
Pellman et al., Part4, supranote 58, at 868.
84.
Pellman et al., Part 5, supra note 58, at 1110.
85.
Id.
86.
87.
See Kain, supra note 78.
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play in the same game after suffering from an MTBI.88 Of course, that
is only after getting permission from the "knowledgeable team
doctors" who do not have expertise in diagnosing and treating
concussions89 -including Dr. Pellman, the committee chairman who
had published the NFL's study.90
As if reading tea leaves,9 1 the MTBI Committee did not
discover any cases of chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) in NFL
players. 92 CTE is a degenerative disease that is progressive and
commonly found in athletes with histories of repeated brain injuries. 93
According to the committee, CTE had been "reported only in boxers
and a few steeplechase jockeys." 94 The committee ignored a possible
connection even after the tenth installment of its study focused on the
similarities between boxing and football. 95 That study revealed a
concussion-inducing NFL hit caused the brain to strike the skull at a
greater velocity and with greater force than any Olympic boxer's
punch.96
After examining both human and animal studies, the
committee concluded that the pattern of brain damage that results in
CTE comes from a large number of sub-concussive blows to the head
that occur over a long period of time. 97 It posited that sub-concussive
blows in the NFL result in greater brain acceleration, and thus
greater brain damage, than any of a boxer's punches except for a
Pellman et al., Part 7, supranote 58, at 84, 89.
88.
Id. at 89.
89.
90.
See supranotes 64-66 and accompanying text.
See infra note 110. This is the same disease that Dr. Omalu discovered in Mike
91.
Webster's brain. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text. Dr. Omalu subsequently
published his findings in Neurosurgery, the same medical journal in which the NFL's Mild
Traumatic Brain Injury Committee published its findings. See infra notes 120-24 and
accompanying text. The troubling part is not the committee failing to discover chronic traumatic
encephalopathy in an NFL player, it is their reaction to Dr. Omalu when he does. See infra notes
120-24 and accompanying text.
92.
Pellman et al., Part 4, supra note 58, at 870.
Press Release, Ctr. for the Study of Traumatic Encephalopathy, New Pathology
93.
Findings Show Significant Brain Degeneration in Professional Athletes with History of
Repetitive Concussions (Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://www.bu.edulcste/news/pressreleases/september-25-2008 ("CTE is a progressive degenerative disease of the brain found in
retired athletes with a history of repetitive concussions. It is clinically associated with the
development of memory loss, confusion, impaired judgment, paranoid and aggressive behavior,
depression, dementia and Parkinsonism [sic]").
94.
Pellman et al., Part 4, supra note 58, at 870.
95.
Viano et al., Part 10, supranote 64.
96.
Id. at 1159 (explaining figure 2).
97.
Pellman et al., Part 4, supra note 58, at 861. Also, repeated sub-concussive blows to
the head would seem to describe what every offensive and defensive lineman experiences on
almost every play. Brandon E. Gavett et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy: A Potential
Late Effect of Sport-Related Concussive and Subconcussive Head Trauma, 30 CLINICS SPORTS
MED. 179, 184 (2011).
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cross.98 In other words, the sub-concussive blows NFL players suffer
are as powerful as those that lead to CTE in boxers. 99 The committee
stated that CTE occurs in boxers as a function of the length of their
career and number of professional fights they are in, not the number
of concussions they receive.100 This evidence is even more troubling
for NFL players because the committee found that NFL players'
brains experienced greater impact than that experienced in boxers'
brains.101 Despite the results of its own study, the committee still
denied the potential for such serious injury in professional football. 102
The NFL's official stance denied any increased risk of suffering a
second injury after a concussion. 03 Ultimately, the league concluded
that concussions among its players did not lead to permanent effects,
such as CTE.104
2. The Player Who Changed the Game
Hall of Fame center "Iron" Mike Webster died on September
24, 2002.105 Webster had anchored the offensive line for a Pittsburgh
Steelers team that won four Super Bowls in six seasons in the
1970s. 106 Prior to his death, he had suffered from such severe pain the
only way he could sleep was to zap himself with a Taser gun.10 7 The
local coroner, Dr. Bennet Omalu, conducted an autopsy that revealed
T-proteins (tau proteins) in Webster's brain-an indication he had
been suffering from CTE at the time of his death.108 This discovery

98.
Viano et al., Part 10, supra note 64, at 1159 fig.2.
Id.
99.
100.
Pellman et al., Part 4, supra note 58, at 870.
101.
See Viano et al., Part10, supra note 64, at 1159 fig.2.
102.
See Pellman et al., Part 4, supra note 58, at 870.
103.
See NFL Outlines for Players Steps Taken to Address Concussions, NFL,
http://www.nfl.cominews/story?id=09000d5d8017cc67&template=without-video&confirm=true
(last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
104.
See id.
105.
Greg Garber, A Tormented Soul, ESPN (Jan. 24, 2005), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/
news/story?id=1972285.
Id.
106.
107.
Id. ("Desperate for a few moments of peace from the acute pain, repeatedly stunning
himself, sometimes a dozen times, into unconsciousness with a black Taser gun."); Laskas, supra
note 31. The article stated:
[He was] squirting Super Glue on his rotting teeth[.] Mike Webster bought himself a
Taser gun, used that on himself to treat his back pain, would zap himself into
unconsciousness just to get some sleep. . . . Soon Mike Webster was homeless, living in
a truck, one of its windows replaced with a garbage bag and tape.
Id.
108.
Omalu et al., supra note 29, at 129-30; see Laskas, supra note 31 ("Brown and red
splotches. All over the place. Large accumulations of tau proteins. Tau was kind of like sludge,
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prompted Dr. Omalu to team with other University of Pittsburgh
doctors to write Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National
Football League Player, an article published in the July 2005 issue of
Neurosurgery.109
Dr. Omalu's article reported the first documented case of
long-term cognitive decline in a former NFL player similar to the CTE
Webster's brain appeared
reported in other former athletes.1 10
outwardly normal, despite "repeated mild concussive brain injury,"
because researchers can only see the symptoms of CTE at the
neuronal level with special microscope slides of the brain.1 11 His brain
did have cortical amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles (NFTs),
two standard indicators for Alzheimer's disease-another condition
that may result from the kinds of head injuries Webster suffered
during his career.1 12 Because his brain did not have any of the other
necessary criteria for a diagnosis of Alzheimer's, it led the research
team to the CTE diagnosis. 113 Doctors thought the cause of the
T-protein buildup was "biochemical cascades that are induced by
cumulative effects of repeated low-grade concussive brain injury."114
Based on that finding, the doctors concluded that during his
NFL career, "[Webster] sustained numerous episodes of mild
traumatic and/or concussive brain injury." 115 Interviews with family
members helped corroborate this finding, confirming that Webster had
suffered from many common symptoms of CTE.1 16 Even though he
clogging up the works, killing cells in regions responsible for mood, emotions, and executive
functioning.").
Omalu et al., supra note 29; see Laskas, supranote 31.
109.
Omalu et al., supra note 29, at 129 ("[T]he first documented case of long-term
110.
neurodegenerative changes in a retired professional NFL player consistent with chronic
traumatic encephalopathy (CTE).").
Id. at 129-30 ("The dura matter and dural sinuses appeared unremarkable.... The
111.
leptomeninges were unremarkable. There was no cerebral atrophy. There were no cortical
contusions, infarcts, or hemorrhages. There was moderate cerebral edema but no evidence of
uncal or cerebellar tonsillar herniation.... The cranial nerves were normal.").
112.
Id. at 130.
113.
Id. at 130-31 ("The [neurofibrillary tangles] distribution is notably different from
that observed in normal aging and [Alzheimer's disease], in which there is early involvement of
the entorhinal cortex and hippocampus with later involvement of the neocortex in advanced
stages.").
114.
Id. at 131.
115.
Id. The report stated:
In a 17-year career as an offensive lineman, he sustained numerous episodes of mild
traumatic and/or concussive brain injury, which is supported by the histological
evidence of remote hemorrhages into the Virchow-Robin spaces of penetrating
parenchymal vessels, with multiple perivascular hemosiderin-laden macrophages.
These histological findings indicate microvascular injury that may be sustained from
repetitive concussive brain injury.

Id.
116.

Id. at 132.
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had neither a noted history of head trauma outside of football nor a
familial history of Alzheimer's disease, his family confirmed he
experienced wild mood swings, signs of cognitive impairment, and
symptoms indicative of Parkinson's disease.117
The postmortem CTE diagnosis directly contradicted Webster's
NFL injury records, which did not mention treatment for any
concussions.11 8 Thus, the article concluded that while "[Webster's
brain] by itself cannot confirm a causal link between professional
football and CTE," it was still useful to help raise awareness that
other NFL players may suffer from this condition. 119
Doctors who reviewed the article in Neurosurgery found the
CTE theory plausible and worth further investigation. 120 Nationally
recognized neurosurgeon Dr. Julian Bailes confirmed its findings:
Webster's brain was inconsistent with those of Alzheimer's patients,
but consistent with those of many boxers. 121 Dr. Bailes posited that
the league's subdued attempts at rule and equipment changes did not
address that "the regular occurrence of rapid acceleration-deceleration
mechanisms of brain injury" still exist in football. 122 Another doctor,
publishing his review of the study in Neurosurgery, defended the
conclusion in Dr. Omalu's article because of CTE's relationship to
boxing and the similarities between the two sports. 123
3. Watch Out for the Blitz: MTBI Committee Requests Retraction
Meanwhile, the NFL's MTBI committee called for a retraction
because the conclusion in Dr. Omalu's article ran counter to all of the
findings in the committee's articles. 124 It claimed Dr. Omalu's article
and its conclusions misinterpreted the applicable medical literature on
117.
Id. at 128. The Center for the Study of Retired Athletes conducted a study that
found similar symptoms of mood disorder in retired athletes, which leads it to the belief there is
a connection between concussions suffered when playing professionally and an eventual
diagnosis of clinical depression. Kevin M. Guskiewicz, Commentary, Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy in a National Football League Player, 57 NEUROSURGERY 134 (2005).
118.
Greg Garber, Blood and Guts, ESPN (Jan. 25, 2005), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl1/
news/story?id=1972286 ("Webster was never treated by team doctors for a concussion, according
to medical records . . . . The Steelers' trainers, too, note he never complained of concussion
symptoms.").
119.
Omalu et al., supranote 29, at 132.
120.
See infra text accompanying notes 121-23.
121.
Julian E. Bailes, Commentary, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National
Football League Player, 57 NEUROSURGERY 134 (2005).
122.
Id.
123.
Joseph Bleiberg, Commentary, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National
Football League Player, 57 NEUROSURGERY 134 (2005).

124.
Ira R. Casson et al., Letter to the Editor, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a
National Football League Player, 58 NEUROSURGERY E1003 (2006).

2012]

TACKLING CONCUSSION LIABILITY

667

CTE, along with a total misunderstanding of CTE reported in
boxers. 125 Because of these apparent flaws, the MTBI Committee
deemed the description of CTE in Mike Webster incorrect. 126 To
support its stance, the MTBI committee relied upon Webster's history
in the league, noting he did not miss game time due to head
injuries. 12 7 Therefore, the committee concluded, head trauma could
not be the "primary cause" of Webster's malfunctioning brain and the
term "chronic traumatic encephalopathy" could not be applied to the
case. 128 The committee called for a retraction or revision of the article.
Omalu never retracted the article.129 In response to the MTBI
Committee's demand for retraction, Omalu and his fellow authors
questioned the committee's position that NFL offensive linemen do not
suffer the necessary repeated episodes of head trauma to induce
CTE.130 They stood by their findings in Webster's brain as sufficiently
similar to those found in boxers' brains, a condition they felt would
lead "most neuropathologists to question whether this patient had a
history of boxing and lead them to examine the clinical history for
Their observations of
episodes of repetitive head trauma."1 31
Webster's brain led them to conclude that the distinct
neuropathological findings are of the unique pattern reported in early
stages of chronic repetitive head trauma. 132 Omalu and his team
recommended that the MTBI Committee investigate the consequences
of finding a confirmed case of CTE in a former NFL player, as they
seriously doubted the committee's assertion that linemen do not suffer
head injuries. 133 Additionally, uninvolved members of the medical
community publicly supported Omalu's refusal to retract his article. 3 4

Id.
125.
Id.
126.
Id. The retraction request stated:
127.
To state that a condition is 'traumatic' in origin, one needs to present a history of
significant injury (in this case, head injury) . . . . Omalu et al. indicate that their
subject had a long career in professional football as an offensive lineman. They
correctly point out that offensive linemen have a low incidence of mild traumatic brain
injury (MTBI) compared with other position players. In the premortem history of this
case, Omalu et al. do not mention any history of cerebral concussion, MTBI, or
removal from play after a blow to the head.
Id. (footnote omitted).
128.
Id. ("We, therefore, urge the authors to retract their paper or sufficiently revise it
and its title after more detailed investigation of this case.").
129.
Bennet I. Omalu et al., Letter to the Editor, Chronic TraumaticEncephalopathy in
a National Football League Player, 58 NEUROSURGERY E1003 (2006) ("[Drs. Casson, Pellman and
Viano] call for the withdrawal of the article, which we [Omalu et al.] would not consider. . .
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
133.
Id. Omalu wrote on behalf of his team stating:
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Despite the research team's response, the MTBI Committee
continued its call for retraction. 135 The committee partially based its
retraction request on the conclusion that a comparison of boxers and
football players does not prove that CTE occurs among football
players.136 In response, Omalu and his team published a second
article, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a National Football
League Player: PartII in Neurosurgery a year later, expanding on and
confirming the findings they published in their first article. 137 Terry
Long, another former Pittsburgh Steelers offensive lineman, died at
forty-five after committing suicide by drinking antifreeze. 138 Long's
autopsy confirmed the second case of CTE in a retired NFL player, but
the neuropathological findings in his brain were slightly different from
those in Webster's brain. 139 Long's CTE symptoms included mood
swings and paranoia; "[h]e manifested unpredictable fluctuations in
mood and personality." 140
Other than swelling caused by the antifreeze, Long's brain
resembled Webster's in that it appeared superficially normal. 141 Also
We doubt Casson et al. really feel that NFL offensive linemen do not experience
repeated episodes of head trauma. It is far more likely that the majority of the head
trauma in the NFL, as well as in American football in general, is under-reported by
the players and the team staff, who accept the occasionally 'dazed' recovery during the
game and postgame headaches simply as part of the sport ....
Id.
134.
E.g., Donald W. Marion, Letter to the Editor, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in
a NationalFootballLeague Player, 58 NEUROSURGERY E1003 (2006). The letter stated:
The letter from Casson et al. is extraordinary in the degree to which it claims
definitive answers to difficult questions about the neuropathological sequelae of
playing football. . . . [The NFL MTBI committee] should welcome the contribution
from Omalu et al. and consider the findings of that report highly relevant to their own
research, rather than recommending retraction of the article.
Id.
135.
Ira R. Casson et al., Letter to the Editor, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a
National Football League Player, 59 NEUROSURGERY E1152 (2006).
136.
Casson et al., supra note 135 ("[T]he end result of the difference we measured in
head impacts sustained in the two sports [boxing and professional football] could be that there is
no chronic encephalopathy in football players." (footnote omitted)). But see supra text
accompanying notes 94-98.
137.
See generally Bennet I. Omalu et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in a
National Football League Player:Part II, 59 NEUROSURGERY 1086 (2006).
138.
Ex-Steeler Long Drank Antifreeze to Commit Suicide, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.
com/nfl/news/story?id=2307003 (last updated Jan. 26, 2006); Laskas, supra note 31.
139.
Omalu et al., supra note 137, at 1086.
140.
Id. at 1087. The article stated:
On some occasions, he would sweat profusely in public settings and become agitated
when approached by other people. At other times, he was noted to exhibit a reassured,
confident, and approachable demeanor.... [He often locked] himself in the house for 1
to 2 days. He would later seek companionship from family and friends as if nothing
had happened.
Id.
141.

Id. at 1088. Their finding from the autopsy revealed:
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like Webster's brain, Long's brain had T-proteins and NFTs that
accompany those who have suffered mild chronic head injuries. 142 The
coroner did not find amyloid plaques, the second Alzheimer's indicator
However, this
Dr. Omalu had found in Webster's brain. 143
strengthened the case for a CTE diagnosis in Long, because it is
consistent to find NFTs present without amyloid plaques in the brains
of victims of mild chronic head injuries.144 The study concluded that
despite some differences, there were many similarities between the
CTE present in Long's brain and that present in Webster's brain.145
But the
paper noted that a
"long-term, longitudinal,
multi-institutional, and multidisciplinary [study]" would be necessary
to fully understand the disease.146
D. The Front Office: The NFL as a Business

The NFL began in Canton, Ohio, as the "American Professional
Football Association" but changed to its current name in 1922.147 The
organization has not always been as successful as it is now; in the first
forty-one years of the league's history, an average of one franchise per
year folded. 148 The NFL now is an unincorporated association that
includes thirty-two separately owned football teams, each with its own
name, logo, colors, and mascot. 149 Because it is an unincorporated
association, Congress granted the NFL an exemption from income tax
under section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code in 1966.150 The
NFL's projected revenue from ticket sales and sponsorship deals for
The dura mater revealed no hemorrhages, xanthochromia, or subdural
membranes.... The cerebral and cerebellar hemispheres appeared symmetrical and
revealed no anomalous gyral-sulcal convolutions, atrophy, contusions, infarcts, or
hemorrhages. There was global edema and congestive swelling. The leptomeninges
appeared normal, as did the vessels of the circle of Willis and the basilar and
vertebral arteries. The cranial nerves were normal.

Id.
Id. at 1089 ("t-positive band- and flame-shaped small and large globose perikaryal
142.
NFT [neurofibrillary tangles] were topographically observed in several regions. The NFTs were
also accompanied by i-positive [neuropil threads].").
Id. at 1087.
143.
144.
Id. at 1090.
145.
Id. at 1091.
Id.
146.
Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2207 n.1 (2010).
147.
148.
Id.
149.
Id. at 2207.
150.
Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 6(a), 80 Stat. 1508 (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2006)) ("§ 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to
exemption of business leagues, boards of trade, etc.) is amended by striking out 'or boards of
trade' and inserting in lieu thereof 'boards of trade, or professional football leagues (whether or
not administering a pension fund for football players)'.").
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the 2011 season is $9.5 billion. 15 1 That number pales in comparison to
the NFL's stated goal of $25 billion in revenue within the next
twenty-five years, an achievable goal. 152 The NFL has tripled its
revenue over the past seventeen years, 153 and revenue growth will
continue as new technology platforms vie for the ability to disseminate
NFL content and the league works to open a new franchise in Los
Angeles. 154
Ultimately, it is the exploits of the players on the field that
allow the league to confidently make such bold revenue predictions.
In the NFL, salaries for injured players are not guaranteed beyond the
season in which the injury is sustained. 155 'The pressure is intense;
there's always someone on the bench waiting to take your place,' says
Dr. Kenneth Podell, director of the Sports Concussion Safety Program
at the Henry Ford Health System." 156 This pressure intensifies when
coaches continue to push injured players back on the field, like New
England Patriot coach, Bill Belichick, did in 2002 when he continued
to send linebacker Ted Johnson into full-contact practices after
Johnson suffered a concussion. 15 7 Any objection would have put
Johnson's job in jeopardy. 15 8 He is now addicted to the pills he takes
to alleviate his post-concussion symptoms, which include mental
lapses, headaches, and depression.159 Belichick's only response was:
"If [Johnson] felt so strongly that he didn't feel he was ready to

151.
Matthew Futterman, NFL Back on Field, and Deals Pile Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB0001424053111904900904576552773485086198.html
(stating that the $9.5 billion in revenue would be a new record, $100 million more than previous
projections for the 2011 season). The league also forecasted an increase in attendance over 2010
numbers, helping to add to and validate the increased revenue projection. Id.

152.

Matt Cutler, NFL Revenue Goal of $25 Billion by 2027, SPORT BuS. (June 4, 2010,

7:17
AM),
http://www.sportbusiness.com/news/174569/nfl-revenue-goal-of-25-billion-by-2027
(outlining the NFL's plan that includes stadium expansions, technology investments, and annual
revenue increases of $1 billion to reach the Commissioner's revenue goal of $25 billion by 2027).

153.

Daniel Kaplan,

Goodell Sets Revenue Goal of $25B by

2027 for NFL,

SPORTsBUSINESS J. (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2010/04/
20100405/This-Weeks-News/Goodell-Sets-Revenue-Goal-Of-$25B-By-2027-For-NFL.aspx.
154.
Jack Bechta, The Revenue Tidal Wave is on its Way, NAT'L FOOTBALL POST (June 11,
2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.nationalfootballpost.com/The-revenue-tidal-wave-is-on-its-way.html.
155.
NFL & NFL PLAYERS ASS'N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 260 app. A, § 9
(2011), available at http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement2011-2020.pdf. This gives injured players a financial incentive to hide concussive symptoms from
team medical personnel for fear that they might lose their place in the starting lineup or get cut.
See, e.g., supra note 118 and accompanying text.
156.
E.M. Swift, One Big Headache, SI VAULT, Feb. 12, 2007, http://
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vaultlarticle/magazine/MAG1107019/index.htm.
Id.
157.
158.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
159.
Swift, supra note 156.
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practice with us, he should have told me." 160 This creates an
unenviable decision for an NFL player: either re-enter play and
potentially sustain further damage to his brain, or tell the coach he
cannot play, opening the door to unemployment in professional
football.161
1. The NFL's Policy for Players Suffering from Dementia
In the 2006 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, the players
and owners negotiation included a new provision they called the "88
Plan,"162 after Baltimore Colts tight end John Mackey who wore the
number 88 throughout his NFL career. 163 Mackey's wife received
attention for her husband's cause after writing a letter to then-NFL
commissioner Paul Tagliabue, detailing Mackey's health decline and
the financial hardship it placed on her. 164 The league answered her
request by creating the plan, which provides medical benefits to
former players who have dementia and have either accumulated
enough seasons as an NFL player or are permanently disabled under
the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan. 165 Families of
former players may receive up to $88,000 per year if the player suffers
from different forms of dementia and must live in an out-of-home
facility, or up to $50,000 per year if they care for the player at home.166
When the league added this provision to the collective
bargaining agreement, it denied any connection between playing
football and later cognitive failure. 167 The NFL's most recent
collective bargaining agreement, which runs from 2011 to 2020,
includes this plan. 168 In its new iteration, the benefit covers ALS,

Id. (alteration in original).
160.
See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
161.
162.
NFL & NFL PLAYERS ASS'N, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006-2012
215 art. XLVIII-D, § 1 (2006), available at http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/
PDFs/General/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGREEMENT%202006%20-%2020
12.pdf.
Frank Deford, Sweetness and Light: The Cautionary Tale of John Mackey, NFL
163.
Star, NPR (Dec. 24, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=98668764.
Alan Schwarz, Wives United by Husbands' Post-N.F.L. Trauma, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
164.
14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/sports/football/14wives.html ("She wrote that
dementia 'is a slow, deteriorating, ugly, caregiver-killing, degenerative, brain-destroying tragic
horror,' and appealed to Mr. Tagliabue to help.").
165.

Id.

Id.
166.
See id. NFL spokesman Greg Aiello said dementia is a condition affecting many
167.
elderly people, denying any connection between the condition and playing NFL football. See id.
NFL & NFL PLAYERS ASS'N, supra note 155, at 230 art. 58, § 1. After the expiration
168.
of the 2011-2020 CBA, benefits will continue to be paid, "but only to a former player who
qualified during the term of [the 2011-20] Agreement and who remains qualified." Id. § 4.
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Parkinson's disease, and dementia. 69 The payments from the plan
will never exceed $100,000 per year, an amount that escalates to
$130,000 per year beginning in the league year 2016,170 which runs
from March to March. 171 However, the amount of disability benefit
the player receives from the NFL Player Disability Plan reduces the
maximum 88 Plan benefit a player receives.172
2. The NFL Meets to Promulgate New Concussion Standards
In June 2007, responding to the attention received by the
concussions in football, the NFL held a league-wide concussion
summit in Chicago.173 Organization officials required all thirty-two
teams send their doctors and medical personnel to the meeting.174 In
addition to team representatives, organizers invited independent
medical professionals to discuss the concussion issue with the NFL.175
But the NFL did not invite Dr. Omalu to speak at the NFL's summit,
despite being the lead author of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathyin
a National Football League Player,7 6 whose findings had furthered

debate on this issue.177
The NFL disseminated new concussion guidelines following the
meeting on August 14, 2007.178 The substance of many of them came
directly from the summit, even though Dr. Omalu, one of the
staunchest advocates for increased safety precautions, was not
present.179
The organization also distributed an informational
pamphlet on concussions to its players,180 telling them: "It is
important to understand that there is no magic number for how many
concussions is too many."181 The league's outside legal counsel later
withdrew the pamphlet, as well as the NFL's August 14, 2007 press
Id. § 2(a).
169.
170.
Id.
171.
Id. at 1 art. 1.
Id. at 230 art. 58, § 2(b).
172.
173.
Dave Goldberg, Goodell Pushes for NFL Concussion Summit, WASH. POST, May 3,
2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/03/AR2007050300031.
html.
Id.
174.
175.
Laskas, supra note 31.
176.
Omalu et al., supra note 29.
177.
Laskas, supra note 31.
178.
Maxwell Complaint, supra note 35, 135.
Id.
179.
180.
NFL Outlines for Players Steps Taken to Address Concussions, NFL,
http://www.nfl.comlnews/story?id=09000d5d8017cc67&template=without-video&confirm=true
(last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
181.
Id. "Current research with professional athletes has not shown that having more
than one or two concussions leads to permanent problems ..... Id.
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release that denied permanent problems result from experiencing
more than one or two concussions. 182
The NFL finally admitted that its 2007 concussion guidelines
were inadequate, and enacted stricter regulations to handle
concussions starting in the 2009 season. 183 The 2009 guidelines are an
addition to the league's 2007 return-to-play standards, which
encouraged team medical personnel to continue treating concussions
conservatively.184 To develop the stricter and more specific 2009
return-to-play standards, the NFL's medical committee worked with
team doctors, independent medical professionals, and the NFL Players
Association.186
The NFL enacted the 2009 concussion guideline supplement
after an "embarrassing" hearing before the House Judiciary
Committee on the issue of player safety the month before.186 During
the hearing, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell refused to say whether
he thought the cognitive decline observed in retired players was linked
with their time in the NFL. 187 Also, committee members, former
players, and even a former team executive criticized the commissioner
for the league's neglect in handling brain injuries in active and former
players.188

Prior to promulgating the accompanying concussion guidelines,
the NFL had commissioned a study of memory-related diseases in
former NFL players. 189 The study concluded that former NFL players
suffer from Alzheimer's disease or other memory-related diseases at a
rate nineteen times higher than the normal rate for men between the
ages of thirty and forty-nine.190 The study's results came even as the

182.
183.

Barnes Complaint, supra note 41,
Barnes Complaint, supra note 41,

184.

League Announces

81; Maxwell Complaint, supra note 35, N 138.
87.

Stricter Concussion Guidelines, NFL

http:/blogs.nfl.com/2009/12/02/league-announces-stricter-concussion-guidelines

(Dec.

2,

2009),

[hereinafter

Stricter Concussion Guidelines].
Id.
185.
186.
Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. to Shift in Its Handling of Concussions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/23/sports/football/23concussion.html.
187.
Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Scolded Over Injuries to Its Players, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2009,
http://nytimes.com/2009/10/29/sports/football/29hearing.hmtl.
188.
Id. The findings of the NFL's MTBI Committee were also called into question. Id.
Dr. Casson was not present to testify on behalf of the MTBI Committee, despite the committee's
request that he be present to testify. Id.
189.
Alan Schwarz, Dementia Risk Seen in Players in N.F.L. Study, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/sports/football/30dementia.html.
190.
Id. Over 1,000 retired players participated in the study. Id. In order to qualify for
the study the player was required to have played at least four NFL seasons. Id.
A normal rate of cognitive disease among N.F.L. retirees age 50 and above (of whom
there are about 4,000) would result in 48 of them having the [dementia-related]
condition; the rate in the Michigan study would lead to 244. . . . So the Michigan
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NFL steadfastly denied a link between cognitive decline in players
and brain injuries, a claim directly refuted by the findings in the
study.191 Dr. Casson, co-chairman of the MTBI Committee, said that
the findings indicate the players in the study believe that they suffer
from memory-related diseases, while the next step for the NFL is to
investigate whether that diagnosis is true and to see if new studies
show similar results.192
3. The NFL Kicks Off Another Study
Both the NFL Players Association and members of Congress
attacked Dr. Casson "for criticizing independent and league-sponsored
studies linking NFL careers with heightened risk for dementia and
Amid this criticism in 2009, the NFL
cognitive decline."193
discontinued its long-range study on the effects of concussions.194
Subsequently, MTBI Committee co-chairmen Dr. Ira Casson and Dr.
David Viano resigned.195 Following their resignation, the NFL
renamed the MTBI Committee the NFL Head, Neck and Spine
Committee in an effort to distance the newly formed group from its
controversial history.196 In October 2011, the NFL announced that the
Head, Neck and Spine Committee is undertaking a broader concussion
research project.197 According to Dr. Mitchel S. Berger, the chairman
of the University of California San Francisco's neurological surgery
department and the leader of the study, this new project would be
considerably different from Dr. Casson's study, which he argues was
devoid of science.198

findings suggest that although 50 N.F.L. retirees would be expected to have dementia
or memory-related disease, the actual number could be more like 300.

Id.
Id.
191.
192.
Id. "The N.F.L. is conducting its own rigorous study of 120 retired players, with
results expected within a few years. All neurological examinations are being conducted by Dr.
Casson." Id.

193.

Howard Fendrich, Ira Casson, David Viano Resign: NFL Concussion Experts Were

Under Attack, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 24, 2009, 10:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2009/11/24/ira-casson-david-viano-re_n_369856.html.
Sam Borden, NF.L. Plans Broader Concussion Research, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2011,
194.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/sports/football/nfl-plans-more-scientific-study-of-concussions.
html.
Fendrich, supra note 193.
195.
Alan Schwarz, House Panel Criticizes New N.F.L. Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
196.
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/sports/football/25concussion.html.
See Borden, supra note 194.
197.
Id. ("'There was no science in that,' Berger said in reference to the study coordinated
198.
by Dr. Ira Casson, who was also the league's primary voice in discrediting outside research on
concussions. Asked if he might use any of the data from Casson's work, Berger shook his head.").
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E. The Only Player to Beat the NFL in Court

Merril Hoge played eight seasons of NFL football with the
Pittsburgh Steelers and the Chicago Bearsl 99 before repeated head
injuries forced him to retire at the age of twenty-nine. 200 After signing
as a free agent with the Chicago Bears prior to the 1994 season, Hoge
suffered a concussion in a preseason game against the Kansas City
Chiefs. 20 1 He played the next week after a team doctor cleared him to
do so, 2 0 2 even though he had trouble recalling the plays he was
supposed to run. 203 Six weeks after his first concussion, Hoge suffered
a second blow to the head, leading him to retire from professional
football. 204
Following his retirement, Hoge sued Bears team physician Dr.
John Munsell. 205 The suit alleged that Munsell allowed Hoge to
retake the field without warning him of the dangers faced by
returning to play too soon and the risk he could sustain more severe
concussions. 206 Hoge ultimately recovered $1.55 million,207 making his
case the only successful lawsuit by a former NFL player against the
league for its handling of concussions. 208 Of Hoge's total recovery,
$1.45 million was awarded for the two years of his contract that he
was not paid because he could not fulfill it as a result of the
concussions. 209 The remaining $100,000 was awarded for Hoge's pain
and suffering. 210

199.
Merril Hoge, PRO-FOOTBALL-REFERENCE, http://www.pro-football-reference.coml/
players/H/HogeMe00.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
200.
Alexander N. Hecht, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sports-Related Concussions: The
Merril Hoge Story, 12 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 17, 26-27 (2002).
201.
Id. at 26.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
204.
Id. at 26-27.
205.
Id. at 27.
206.
Id.
207.
Rummana Hussain, Hoge Wins Lawsuit Against Doctor, CHI. TRIB., July 22, 2000,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-07-22/sports/0007220191_1-hoge-concussions-brain
damage.
208.
Andrew B. Carrabis, Head Hunters: The Rise of Neurological Concussions in
American Football and Its Legal Implications, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 371, 377 (2011).
Id.
209.
210.
Id.
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II. COMING TO THE LINE OF SCRIMMAGE: SURVEYING THE FIELD, THE
OPPONENT, AND THE PLAYER'S OPTIONS

The Hoge decision demonstrates that a player can successfully
sue the NFL for mishandling concussions. 211 However, the decision
does not address how an entire group of former NFL players could
successfully sue in order to protect their rights from being
systematically undermined by the NFL's stance towards concussions.
In order to potentially succeed in court, players should file a class
action suit alleging negligence and fraud. A jury would likely find the
league liable for negligence based on its substandard handling of
players' cognitive well-being by consistently failing to adopt the
necessary rules, practices, and procedures to protect its players. The
fraud claim could also succeed based on the league's promulgation of
misinformation on which players detrimentally relied in the scope of
their employment. Finally, the players should file this class action
suit in the district of Minnesota because of the players' successful
litigation history in that district during the 2011 lockout dispute with
team owners.
A. The Players'Ability to Huddle Up and Call a Class Action Play
The first step in analyzing how players should successfully
proceed in a suit against the NFL is to look at the group's viability at
achieving class status. According to Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a group of potential plaintiffs must meet four
requirements in order for a court to certify the group for class action
litigation:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
212
class.

A court should grant the players class status because they
successfully meet the necessary prerequisites. 213 The twelve thousand
retired and current players make maintaining individual suits

211.

212.
213.

See supra text accompanying notes 201-07.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
See id.; discussion supraPart II.A.
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untenable for both the players and for the league. 214 Joinder of twelve
thousand players would be too complex, forcing certain players to
represent themselves rather than benefit from work already done for a
very large class of similarly situated plaintiffs. 215 The most efficient
and certain way to include all NFL players with cognitive
deterioration would require asking a court to certify the group with
class status, which would represent all players against the league at
once. The league would also benefit from the players suing in one
large class. Defending one lawsuit with one set of evidence and
discovery would be cheaper and more efficient for the league than
defending numerous individual player lawsuits. Combining both
current and former players of different eras into the same class would
be proper because the NFL's series of inadequate medical policies
affected all of them. Any reward recovered would be in current
dollars, because the harm caused by the league should not be
monetarily related to the salary earned by the specific player, because
the NFL's substandard policies governed all players of varying salary
levels over many years. Finally, courts should not use salaries to
measure the award because the older players who made less money
suffered harm while the league grew into the most profitable US
professional sports league. 216
After establishing the numerosity requirement, the players
must show that questions of law and fact are common to the class. 2 17
Each of the potential plaintiffs played NFL football, all under the
league's substandard regime of handling concussive brain injuries. 218
Even though the players come from various teams that competed in
different eras, "there are questions of law and fact common to the
class." 219 The players, as well as the league, would benefit because the
legal and factual questions are common to all class members, and
those questions predominate over any questions that affect only

Legal Issues Relating to Football Head Injuries (PartI & II): Hearings Before the H.
214.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Legal Issues Relating to Football
Head Injuries] (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
That number is sufficient to make joinder impracticable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
215.
Plaintiffs may join in one action if "(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise
in the action." Id. 20(a).
In a League of Its Own: America's National Football League Offers a Business
216.
Lesson to Other Sports, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/6859210
[hereinafter In a League of Its Own].
217.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
EasterlingComplaint, supranote 34, 37(b).
218.
219.
See id. 36(b).
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individual members of the class. 2 20 Even though a court may call into
question the different ways that individual teams handled
concussions, the league's ineffectual handling of concussions and its
failure to promulgate sufficient league-wide standards for player
protection will outweigh these concerns. 221
The third requirement for class certification is that the claims
of the class representatives must be typical of each class member's
claims and those claims must predominate over any questions that
only affect individual members of the class. 222 Because it is the NFL's
league-wide policies and practices that cause these common issues, the
claims of the class representatives are typical of each class member's
claims and those claims predominate over any questions that only
affect individual members of the class. 223 The claims of the class are
representative and typical of claims of each class member, as all of
them will have been players in the NFL. 2 24 The league's inadequate
concussion policies and regulations affect each player because its rules
apply to all players from every team. 225 Also, the league's denial of a
link between concussions and subsequent cognitive impairment
applies to players uniformly, thus supporting the notion that this class
satisfies the typicality and predominance requirements. The final
class certification requirement is that the players representing the
class are a proper representation of the class. 226 Regardless of the era
or team for which the player competed, he suffered from the NFL's
long-running historical choice to ignore the perils to player safety, and
because of that the class of NFL players will fairly and adequately
represent all members that compose the class. 227
While factual distinctions will inevitably exist among the
plaintiff class, each distinction or concussion is further evidence of the
league-wide substandard handling of concussions and players'
cognitive health. Finally, the proposed class of players meets the 23(a)
requirements to serve as plaintiffs because of its numerosity, the
common questions of law and fact that pertain to all potential
plaintiffs, the NFL's common defenses against the claims, and because
220.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).

221.
See supra Part I.B.
222.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
223.
Easterling Complaint, supra note 34, 37(c).
224.
Id.
225.
See NFL, Preface to OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES AND CASEBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
FOOTBALL LEAGUE (2011), available at http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/rulebook/
pdfs/1 Preface.pdf ("[Aill rules contained in this book apply uniformly to both the American and
National Football Conferences.").
226.
Easterling Complaint, supra note 34, 37(d).
See supra Part I.B.
227.
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the class will adequately represent the interest of all players affected
by the league's actions.
Once a class is properly certified under Rule 23(a), it must
satisfy Rule 23(b) in order to maintain class certification. 228 This
potential class meets this requirement by satisfying Rule 23(b)(3),
because the players would stipulate a common question of law or fact
that would apply to the entire class. 229 The players satisfy this
requirement because their class meets certain pertinent factors, such
as the desirability of concentrating litigation in the forum under Rule
23(b)(3)(C) 230 as well as there being only minor difficulties that both
the plaintiffs and the defendants will face in the class action under
Rule 23(b)(3)(D). 231 Facing a class action suit would be simpler for the
NFL because it would concentrate all plaintiffs' claims in one forum
and suit, instead of having different players bringing cases across the
Additionally, one set of discovery requests would be
country.
preferable to many discovery requests in different suits, which is what
would happen if the players were not granted class status. Because of
this, there are few difficulties the NFL would face in managing the
class action that it would not confront in individual suits players
would bring based on the NFL's substandard handling of concussions.
Additionally, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23.2
governs class action suits that involve unincorporated associations,
such as the NFL. 2 32 Despite the NFL's income tax status as an
unincorporated association, Rule 23.2 should not apply because the
suit would be against the NFL as a whole, rather than the individual
teams. 233 This rule is not implicated because it questions whether an
unincorporated association will adequately protect its interests and
those of its constituent members. 234 The NFL will protect its interests
in this situation because this case would involve its concussion
policies. Because the league and the teams that comprise it were
creating and implementing the unsatisfactory concussion policies at
issue, the NFL, as an unincorporated association, will serve as a
proper defendant and will adequately defend the claims against it.

228.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b).
229.
Id. 23(b)(3).
Id. 23(b)(3)(C).
230.
Id. 23(b)(3)(D).
231.
232.
Id. 23.2.
233.
Id. ("This rule applies to an action brought by or against the members of an
unincorporated association as a class by naming certain members as representative parties.").
The NFL is an unincorporated association, but this lawsuit would proceed against the NFL as a
whole, not against the individual teams that are members of the unincorporated association. See
supra note 149 and accompanying text.
See NFL, supra note 225.
234.
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B. The Players Get to the Line of Scrimmage:
Callinga Play for Negligence

Negligence will be the players' most successful claim because
the NFL has consistently breached its duty to protect the neurological
well-being of its players by not enacting adequate rules, policies, and
regulations that protect the players. 235 The NFL possesses a general
duty to exercise reasonable care because its conduct as the governing
body of a violent game creates a risk of physical harm. 2 36 The district
of Minnesota provided a favorable ruling for the players in the suit
filed during the 2011 lockout between the players and the NFL
owners, thus the players should file their suit in the same district. 237
The players' suit should include both their negligence and fraud
claims.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency states that an employer

bears the duty to provide reasonably safe working conditions for its
employees, taking into account the kind of activity in which the
employees are engaged. 238 In addition, the employer must warn its
employees of the risk of unsafe conditions that the employer realizes
the employees may not discover through their exercise of due care. 2 39
The league breached the duty to warn the players that professional
football can cause long-term mental health risks, which the players
might not discover through the exercise of their duty of care. 240
There is no immunity from tort liability for an employer when
its employee is acting within the scope of employment. 241 The players
are acting within the scope of their employment each time they play
football, and every time they play it is the league's responsibility to
provide safe working conditions. 242 Because the NFL did not provide
adequate rules and failed to alert the players of the dangers
concussions pose, 243 the NFL failed to provide a safe working
environment for the players.
The NFL also breached its duty to warn, because the league
had reason to know the problems that concussions can cause in
235.
Barnes Complaint, supra note 41, T 182.
236.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7 (2010) ("An actor ordinarily has a duty to
exercise reasonable care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm.").
237.
See generally Brady v. NFL, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. 2011).
238.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 492 (1958) (amended 2005).
239.
Id. An employee's duty of care to its employer involves acting with the standard skill
required for the kind of work the employee performs. Id. § 379.
240.
See id. § 492.
241.
Id. § 470 cmt. c ("A master has no immunity from liability for negligence to a
servant while the servant is acting within the scope of employment.").
242.
Id. § 470.
243.
See supraPart I.B-C.
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players, while the players did not know of the risk that concussions
cause to mental, physical, and emotional health. 244 Popular medical
literature, dating as far back as 1952, noted brain changes in
contact-sport athletes, 245 and more refined medical research was
emerging yearly to help inform the NFL's concussion standards. 246
Also, the NFL commissioned its own thirteen-part study that provided
substantial information linking concussions and subsequent mental
decline.2 47
The NFL acknowledged it had a duty to warn the players when
it changed its official concussion policies in 2009, making it the second
time in two years that the league changed its rules. 2 48 Another tacit
admission by the league that concussions cause dementia and other
cognitive problems is the inclusion of 88 Plan in the league's Collective
Bargaining Agreement since 2006.249 The fact that other diseases that
affect grown men, whether or not the men have played professional
football, do not result in specific disability payments under the NFL's
collective bargaining agreement undercuts the league's position that
memory disorders affect many people who never play football. 25 0 The
league's change in position on the issue, despite similar evidence that
had already existed years prior, is evidence of the NFL's negligent
conduct.
A warning from the league would have been effective in
reducing the players' risk of harm because it would have allowed each
player to make individualized and informed decisions regarding his
own cognitive health and how to proceed in his career. 251 The failure
to warn qualifies as a form of basic negligence because the range of
the defendant's conduct that gives rise to the duty is sufficiently
broad. 2 52 Even if a defendant adequately warns of the risks it created,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 18(a) (2010).
244.
A defendant whose conduct creates a risk of physical or emotional harm can fail to
exercise reasonable care by failing to warn of the danger if:
(1) the defendant knows or has reason to know: (a) of that risk; and (b) that
those encountering the risk will be unaware of it; and
(2) a warning might be effective in reducing the risk of harm.
Id.
245.
Supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
246.
See supra Part I.A.
247.
See supra Part I.C.
248.
Stricter ConcussionGuidelines, supra note 184.
249.
See supra Part I.D.3.
250.
Schwarz, supranote 189.
251.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 18(a)(2) (2010).
252.
Id. § 18 cmt. a ("A warning can often be a useful device for reducing the risk of harm
occasioned by the defendant's conduct. The range of defendant conduct that can give rise to the
obligation to warn is so broad as to make clear that the failure to warn is a basic form of
negligence.").
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the defendant can still fail to exercise its duty of care if it does not
adopt additional safety measures to protect against the foreseeable
risk that remains. 253 The NFL failed to adopt adequate standards to
protect players' cognitive health after suffering from concussions,
despite knowing the steps it needed to take. 254 Ultimately, the league
knew of the risk and knew the players would be unaware of it. A
warning would have reduced the risk of harm to the players.255 Even
when the NFL finally did promulgate standards, they were based on
flawed science, and the NFL knew it was shutting out rivaling
interpretations of the same data.2 56
C. The Players' Case for FraudAgainst the NFL
The players could also argue that the NFL committed fraud
against them. 257 Even though fraud is a Minnesota state law claim,
the plaintiffs would be able to bring this claim, in addition to their
other claims, in a Minnesota federal court because the amount in
controversy will be greater than $75,000 and there will be diversity of
citizenship. 258 Venue is proper in Minnesota because the NFL has
maintained a presence and continuous business with the Minnesota
Vikings in the state, thus events giving rise to claims occurred in the
state. 259
The players who would sue over brain injuries were employees
of the NFL. 260 An employee has a cause of action for fraud against his
employer when he adversely relies on misinformation provided by the
employer. 261 The facts that give rise to negligence liability also could
contribute to a fraud claim: the players relied on the NFL's claim that
253.
Id. § 18(b).
Barnes Complaint, supra note 41, 1 186 ("Despite the fact that other sporting
254.
associations exist, such as the National Hockey League and the World Boxing Association, which
have decades ago established standardized association-wide concussion management rules, until
August 14, 2007, the NFL failed to establish any guidelines or policies to protect the mental
health and safety of its players.").
255.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 18.
256.
See supra Part I.C.2.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (9th ed. 2009).
257.
(Fraud is a] knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact
to induce another to act to his or her detriment[;] . . . [a] misrepresentation made
recklessly without belief in its truth to induce another person to act[; and] . . . [a] tort
arising from a knowing misrepresentation, concealment of material fact, or reckless
misrepresentation made to induce another to act to his or her detriment.
Id.

258.
259.

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

260.
261.

NFL & NFL PLAYERS ASS'N, supra note 155, at 260 app. A.
37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 144 (2012).
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denied that permanent problems result from more than one or two
concussions; 262 and the MTBI Committee promulgated misleading
information that led to the league policy that denied any link between
CTE, and later life cognitive deterioration. 2 6 3
concussions,
Furthermore, the league's conclusions, based on findings from its
MTBI Committee, stood at odds with generally accepted research in
the field of cognitive science. 264
The NFL also actively tried to conceal and discredit
information contrary to its stated position that concussions do not lead
to CTE. 2 6 5 Silence does not constitute fraud unless there is a duty to
speak, which exists in this case because of the employer-employee
relationship. 2 6 6 In order to find fraud for active concealment of
information, there must be more than just silence; there must be a
purpose behind the concealment of the information. 267 Here, the
league promulgated information the medical community generally
viewed as insufficient while simultaneously attacking the credibility of
medical researchers that presented information contradicting the
NFL's stance on concussions. 268 Also, the NFL used the MTBI
Committee to conceal unfavorable information, despite the league's
duty to speak on the matter in order to protect its employees'
health. 269
It was not until late 2009 that the league finally acknowledged
the connection between concussions that players suffer and their
long-term health effects. 270 The NFL's decision to replace those in
charge of its concussion studies and alterations to the league's returnto-play standards amount to "tacit acknowledgments that it was no
262.
Barnes Complaint, supra note 41, 76.
263.
Id. 211.
See supra Part I.C.1-2.
264.
Supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
265.
37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 203.
266.
Id.
267.
268.
See supra Part I.C.
269.
37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 203 (2012) ("Concealment ... may consist of
withholding information asked for, or of making use of some device to mislead, thus involving act
and intention, or of concealing special knowledge where there is a duty to speak." (footnote
omitted)).
Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Acknowledges Long-Term Concussion Effects, N.Y. TIMES,
270.
Dec. 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/sports/football/21concussions.html?pagewan
ted=all.
"It's quite obvious from the medical research that's been done that concussions can
lead to long-term problems" the [NFL] spokesman Greg Aiello said ....
Told that his statement was the first time any league official had publicly
acknowledged any long-term effects of concussions, and that it contradicted past
statements made by the league, its doctors and literature currently given to players,
Aiello said: "We all share the same interest. That's as much as I'm going to say."
Id.
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longer able to defend a position that conflicted with nearly all
Prior to this
scientific understanding of head trauma."271
announcement, NFL players had relied on their employer's steadfast
stance against any link between brain injuries and CTE. 27 2 The NFL
fraudulently misrepresented the facts and refuted commonly accepted
science through the MTBI Committee, using that information to craft
its return-to-play standards. 273 These fraudulent acts harmed the
players and put their safety in jeopardy.
D. The League Calls its Defense:
The NFL's PossibleResponses to the Players' Claims
The NFL could mount two different defenses to the potential
claims available to the players in their suit over cognitive
deterioration, even though neither is likely to prevail. The NFL can
argue that the players assumed the risk of injury from playing NFL
football, and the other defense that the NFL may propose is the lack of
incentive to provide misinformation. The latter defense may fare
better, but will probably not prove successful because the league's
desire for growth would be impeded if the extent of the players' risks
for injuries were widely known.
1. The Assumption of the Risk Defense
When a plaintiff voluntarily assumes a risk of harm that
naturally arises from a defendant's negligent or reckless conduct, the
plaintiff is barred from recovering for that resulting harm. 274 This
assumption of risk does not need to be express; the league can argue it
may be implied through an NFL player's decision to play football. 275
This defense, as proposed by the NFL, would posit that the players
knew of the dangers inherent in playing football and they undertook
that danger willingly by becoming NFL players.
The players would respond that they did not know about the
dangerous conditions when they became NFL players. A football
player fully understands the possibility of a broken arm or torn
anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) and has thus either contractually or
271.
Id.
272.
Maxwell Complaint, supra note 35, 1 559 ("The [players], among others, justifiably
relied on these misrepresentations to their detriment in getting care for their injuries.").

273.

See supra Part I.C.2.

274.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
275.
See id. § 496C cmt. b ("[T]he basis of the rule is the policy of the law which refuses
to permit one who manifests willingness that another shall continue in a course of conduct to
complain of it later if he is hurt as a result of it.").
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implicitly assumed that risk; but he did not assume the risk he would
develop dementia at a rate nineteen times the normal rate for men
between the ages of thirty and forty-nine. 276 He could not have
assumed this risk, because the NFL did not promulgate this
information to the players and discredited any research that ran
counter to the information the NFL wanted to provide the players. 277
A plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm resulting from a
defendant's conduct unless the plaintiffs assumption is a knowing
one, with an understanding and appreciation of the unreasonableness
of the risk. 278 Because of this requirement, the absence of an express
agreement prevents a plaintiff from assuming any risk because he is
unaware of the risk itself, much less the risk's unreasonableness. 279
While the risk must be neither known nor apparent, a plaintiffs
failure to discover or appreciate the risk does not affect the
assumption of the risk, only the defense of contributory negligence.280
The players did not know of the risk of cognitive decline
because they did not regulate the game's safety, have access to the
league's safety information, or have access to its means of collecting
the information.2 81 NFL players assume certain risks when they take
the field, but the risk of eventual cognitive impairment is not one of
them.
2. The NFL's Incentives to Keep this Information from Players
The NFL would argue that it has little incentive to provide
misinformation regarding player health as the league strives to reach
its goal of $25 billion in revenue. 282 As the players are the league's
most visible assets, from playing in the games to spurring jersey sales,
the league would argue that the potential backlash of harming its
most valuable assets would be tremendous. 283 Even though players
come and go, the sport's credibility would be irreparably damaged if

276.
Schwarz, supra note 189.
277.
See supraPart I.C.
278.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D.
279.
Id. § 496D cmt. b.
Id.
280.
281.
See Pellman et al., Part 1, supra note 58 (discussing the NFL MTBI Committee
conducting studies and using that information to promulgate the league's return to play
standards).
282.
Cutler, supra note 152.
283.
See Polamalu, Packers Top NFL Jersey, Merchandise Sales Lists, NFL (Apr. 14,
2011, 5:02 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81f410f2/article/polamalu-packers-topnfl-jersey-merchandise-sales-lists [hereinafter Jersey Sales).
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fans knew that players were unknowingly risking their mental and
physical well-being each time they took the field.2 84
But current players benefit the league much more than retired
players, who neither sell jerseys at the rate current players do, nor sell
out stadiums on game day. 2 85 Because the NFL's current model has
made it the most successful professional sports league in the United
States, there is little incentive to change the winning recipe as long as
people still fill stadiums and watch games on television. 286 As a
result, the league could argue it would have little reason to jeopardize
the health and safety of its players. Despite that claim, the league's
behavior shows otherwise: it has frequently been reluctant to change
its rules and health standards, and when it has done so the league
used its MTBI Committee's questionable findings as the basis. 287
III. HOW THE PLAYERS CAN CALL THE WINNING PLAY:
A PLAN FOR SUCCESSFUL CONCUSSION LITIGATION AGAINST THE NFL

The preceding discussion outlines the NFL's negligent and
fraudulent behavior toward its players, who as a result have suffered
cognitive impairment. In order to protect their rights, the players
should file a class action complaint alleging both negligence and fraud
under the state law of Minnesota, and file the complaint in federal
district court in Minnesota. They should win compensatory damages
for the injury the NFL's substandard concussion policy has caused.
The suit should also lead to an alteration in the current rules to avoid
putting players' cognitive health in jeopardy.

See Schwarz, supra note 186.
284.
"I don't want to call [the shift in the handling of concussions] forced, but it's been
strongly urged because of the awareness of the issue these days," Chester Pitts, a
lineman and union representative for the Houston Texans, said in a telephone
interview. 'When you have Congress talking about the antitrust exemption and them
calling them the tobacco industry, that's pretty big."
Id.
See Jersey Sales, supra note 283. The list of jersey sales is made from April 1, 2010
285.
to March 31, 2011, and on that list only players active during the 2010 season were represented.
Id.
In a League of Its Own, supra note 216. The story reported:
286.
As a business, American football has been beating its rivals handily for years. It has
the highest total revenues of the four . . . . It remains the most popular of the four big
American sports on almost every measure, from opinion polls to television ratings.
And it has translated all of this into rising profits. The average football team has a
market value of around 3.9 to 4.4 times revenues, compared with ratios of 2.2 to 3.0
for the other leagues.
Id.
287.

See supra Part I.D.2-3; see also supra Part I.B.
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A. To the Victor Go the Spoils: The Players'DamagesAward
The NFL would have to pay damages for pain and suffering as
a result of the players' successful negligence claim, in addition to
punitive damages that result from successfully proving the player's
allegation of fraud.28 8 The pain and suffering damages are the same
In
category of damages that Hoge received in his lawsuit.28 9
Minnesota, the court may award punitive damages upon clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant disregarded other individuals'
safety. 290 Minnesota's history of jurisprudence shows that it is averse
to intentional violations of the rights of others. 291 The NFL violated
the players' rights to safety and complete information.
In the only successful concussion suit by a player, Merrill Hoge
recovered $1.55 million in the year 2000, $100,000 of which was for
pain and suffering. 292 This amount would be insufficient for the
plaintiffs today, because most of the retired players within the class
never made the NFL's current average salary of $1.9 million. 293 The
average salary in the NFL has increased 450 percent since 1991, when
the average was $422,149.294 Only three years later Merrill Hoge
signed his free-agent contract with the Chicago Bears, worth $2.4
million-far more than the league average. 295
Because salaries keep increasing, the ratio of pain and
suffering benefits would continue to shrink as compared to what Hoge
was able to recover. 29 6 Hoge's award of $50,000 per season for pain
and suffering in his suit represented 6.9 percent of the salary he
would have received if he had been able to play. 29 7 Because salaries
The recovery does not include the cost of medical bills because Plan 88 covers those
288.
bills. NFL & NFL PLAYERS ASS'N, supra note 155, at 230 art. 58, § 2. This recovery is an addition
to any medical coverage already offered by the NFL to its current and former players. See supra
text accompanying notes 165-66.
Hussain, supra note 207.
289.
290.
MINN. STAT. ANN. §549.20 (West 2011).
20A2 BRENT A. OLSON, MINNESOTA BUSINESS LAW DESKBOOK § 34:77 (2011-2012 ed.
291.
2011).
292.
Hussain, supra note 207.
The Average NFL Player, BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 27, 2011, 5:00 PM),
293.
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/l_06/b4214058615722.htm.
Average NFL Salary Up 18.5 Percent, to $422,149, BALT. SUN, Dec. 27, 1991,
294.
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-12-27/sports/1991361086_1_dan-marino-nfl-playersquarterbacks (noting that the league's 1991 average salary was "18.5 percent higher than the
1990 average salary of $356,382 and 41 percent higher than the 1989 average of $299,616").
295.
Hecht, supranote 200, at 26, 29.
296.
The $100,000 (or $50,000 per season remaining) was 6.9 percent of Hoge's
remaining $1.45 million on his contract. Hussain, supra note 207. The $50,000 per season
awarded by the Hoge jury is only 2.6 percent of the 2011 average NFL salary of $1.9 million. See
The Average NFL Player,supra note 293.
297.
Hussain, supra note 207.
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for NFL players are dramatically higher than they were in 1994 (when
Hoge signed the contract his recovery is based on), the $50,000 he
received would represent a much smaller percentage of a player's
salary today than it did for Hoge. 298 Additionally, any amount of
damages a player receives will not affect any amount of Plan 88
benefits because that payment is for medical care and this payment is
for the NFL committing tort negligence. 2 99
Doubling the Hoge recovery would still not be sufficient to meet
the award's ratio to current player salary, but it serves as an adequate
starting point. 300 There are 12,000 active and retired NFL players
who could potentially recover from the proposed lawsuit. 301 More than
6 percent of those players suffer from various brain injuries, whereas
only 1.2 percent of comparably aged men in the general US population
suffer from similar afflictions. 302 Multiplying the NFL player's 4.9
percent increase in odds of suffering from a brain-related condition
with the $200,000 recovery and 12,000 current and former players, the
class of players should recover a total of $117.6 million for pain and
suffering. That number represents only 1.2 percent of the NFL's
projected 2011 revenue, which will continue to grow. 303
The NFL should also have to pay punitive damages for
fraudulently misleading its players through the MTBI Committee. 304
The NFL has financially benefitted far more than the cost it will incur
by paying compensatory awards, and the punitive recovery should
force the league to bear the cost of the players' losses.305
In Pacific Mutual Insurance Company v. Haslip, the US

Supreme Court endorsed a set of constraints for punitive damage
awards that consist of seven factors, the most applicable being "the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct," as well as how
long the conduct lasted. 306 In this instance, the harm from the NFL
298.
See The Average NFL Player, supra note 293 (providing the average and median
salaries of NFL players).
299.
NFL & NFL PLAYERS ASS'N, supra note 155, at 230 art. 58, § 2.
See supra notes 293-96 and accompanying text.
300.
301.
Legal Issues Relating to FootballHead Injuries,supra note 214.
EasterlingComplaint, supra note 34, 1 11.
302.
See Futterman, supra note 151.
303.
304.
See supra Part II.C.
305.
Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO.
L.J. 421, 423 (1998).
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Halsip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991). The seven factors are:
306.
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award
and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that
actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the
duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the
existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant
of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of having the
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has already occurred and probably falls under Haslip's subjective
definition of "reprehensibility."307 In the course of promulgating this
misinformation, the NFL has become the highest grossing domestic
sports league.308
The penalty should be an amount that forces the league to
internalize the loss that its conduct generated.309 The NFL should
bear $470.4 million in punitive damages-four times the
compensatory damages it should have to pay.310 This will make the
NFL liable for a total of $588 million to past players for its conduct
regarding the league's concussion stance. The 2010 season saw the
NFL revenue grow to $9.3 billion, with growth anticipated in each
ensuing season. 311 Even though this only constitutes 6.3 percent of
the league's revenue based on the 2010 season, the NFL will also have
to address the public relations implications of this suit, including
upset fans who realize the league deprived their favorite players of
vital safety information.
B. Changing the Rules of the Game at Halftime

Finally, the court should force the league to adopt rule changes
in order to prevent the further growth of this problem. The court
should order the NFL to work with the NFL Players Association to
craft rule changes that satisfy both parties while achieving maximum
safety standards. The most obvious change would be to ban the
three-point stance, which linemen use as their starting position on
almost every play before launching themselves headfirst into the
attacking defenders.312 The Commissioner has already entertained
this idea, 313 and it is a very palatable change to the game that would
increase safety without compromising competition or fan enjoyment. 314
The NFL has already introduced a new rule prior to the 2011 season
that has teams kick off to a shorter field, dramatically reducing the
defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant; (e) all the
costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its
conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards
against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation.

Id.
307.
Id. The NFL chose profits in promulgating misinformation over accepted science
that would have advocated player safety. See supraPart II.E.2.
308.
In a League of Its Own, supra note 216.
309.
Hylton, supra note 305, at 439.
310.
See supranotes 300-03 and accompanying text.
311.
Judy Battista, Details Emerge on Battle Over Projected Revenue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/sports/football/19players.html.
312.
Borden, supranote 194.
313.
Id.
314.
See supraPart I.B.
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number of kick returns in games. 315 Though the league had little
incentive to change its rules in the past, it can now alter its rules with
input from the players to achieve a balance among safety,
competitiveness, and maintaining the game. 316
Additionally, the NFL should institute game suspensions for
players who recklessly lead with their helmets, causing
helmet-to-helmet contact (spearing). The league currently fines
players for those penalties, but suspensions would force players to
respect the safety of the game as well as the safety of their fellow
players. 317 These are relatively simple ways to protect player safety
without drastically changing the makeup of NFL football.
IV. THE STATE OF THE GAME MOVING FORWARD
Current and former players should band together to bring a
class action lawsuit against the NFL for its negligent and fraudulent
acts regarding its concussion policies and safety rules. The players
should succeed on these claims and should be entitled to the
compensation that this Note discusses based on the only successful
recovery in a concussion lawsuit against the NFL. That recovery is
modified to reflect the escalating current salaries and how the players
are the most vital asset to the league's continued success. Instituting
this suit in the district of Minnesota will capitalize on the players'
history of litigation success in that jurisdiction.
The NFL has to answer for its negligent and fraudulent
conduct toward past and current players. It also has to make the
game safer. This will help protect the league's most valuable
commodity-its players. While the NFL has taken steps in the right
direction, it still has a long way to go. In a 2011 game, James
Harrison once again committed an illegal helmet-to-helmet hit, this
time on Cleveland Browns quarterback Colt McCoy. 3 18 This was
Harrison's fifth illegal tackle on quarterbacks in three seasons.319
Meanwhile, McCoy was allowed to re-enter the game two plays later
without receiving a concussion test on the sideline, even though he

315.

New Kickoff Rules Are Winning Few Fans Among Players, Coaches, NFL,

http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d821785ce/article/new-kickoff-rules-are-winning-fewfans-among-players-coaches (last updated Aug. 15, 2011) (noting that touchbacks rose from 16
percent during the 2010 season to 33 percent during the 2011 preseason).
See generally supratext accompanying note 303.
316.
317.
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was later diagnosed with one as a result of that play.3 20 The NFL has
work to do in order to protect its players' cognitive well-being.
Punishing the New Orleans Saints and its coaching staff for the
endangerment of other players resulting from the team's bounty
program does not remedy the league's past failings in protecting
player health. 321 The severe punishment levied on the Saints should
not divert attention from the NFL's past failings; rather, it should
draw even more attention to them. 322
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